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The Federalization of Organized Crime:
Advantages of Federal Prosecution
by
JOHN C. JEFFRiEs, JR.,* AND HONORABLE JOHN GLEESON**
Introduction
Debates about the federalization of crime traditionally have fo-
cused on substantive law. New federal crimes are proposed and cre-
ated as responses to problems the states cannot handle. They are
opposed and lamented as unwarranted intrusions into the states' do-
main.1 Advocates on both sides assume that crime definition is the
chief determinant of the respective spheres of state and federal law.
Today, that assumption is largely false. It is true, of course, that
federal and state crimes appear to have different coverage. Federal
crimes have distinctive jurisdictional components and a characteristic
complexity that set them apart from the simpler and broader pro-
nouncements of state law. Considered individually, federal crimes
often seem specialized and narrow. Considered collectively, they are
not. Even before the recent flurry of situational crime legislation and
the passage of the 1994 Crime Bill, federal law reached virtually all
robberies,2 most schemes to defraud, 3 many firearms offenses,4 all
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1. See William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National Conference on State-
Federal Judicial Relations, 78 VA. L. Rnv. 1657, 1660 (1992) ("[S]imple congressional self-
restraint is called for.., in the federalization of crimes.. . ."); Lorie Hearn, Trying Times
Are Ahead:- Justice O'Connor Says Federalization of Crime Could Overwhelm the Court,
SAN DIEGo UNmoN-TRYm., Aug. 17, 1994, at A4 ("Congress seems to be moving clearly in
the direction of recognizing national problems and deciding that the way to deal with them
is to federalize these issues.... This is a change that should be of grave concern, in my
view, to federal judges.").
2. The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988), punishes anyone who "in any way or
degree obstructs, delays or affects commerce or the movement of any article of commodity
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loan sharking,5 most illegal gambling operations, 6 most briberies,7 and
in commerce, by robbery or extortion ...." Although this statute purports to require an
effect on interstate commerce, it has been construed very broadly. See, e.g., United States
v. Norris, 792 F.2d 956, 958 (10th Cir. 1986) ("With little general discussion, courts have
allowed § 1951 to be used against ordinary robberies."); United States v. Scaife, 749 F.2d
338, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1984) (requiring only a "de minimis" effect on interstate commerce);
United States v. Jarrett, 705 F.2d 198, 201-03 (7th Cir. 1983) (same).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (punishing anyone who, "having devised or intending to
devise any scheme or artifice to defraud," uses the mail or "knowingly causes to be deliv-
ered by mail ... any matter or thing").
The notion that this statute protects only the direct federal interest in the integrity of
the mails has been an anachronism for nearly a century. See generally Jed S. Rakoff, The
Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 Duo. L. REV. 771 (1980) (arguing that the mailing
requirement is nothing more than a jurisdictional element). Today, the statute is construed
broadly to prohibit all types of fraudulent schemes, so long as there is some use of the
mails. Moreover, although the mailing requirement had generally been construed to re-
quire that the defendant cause a mailing to occur before he received the fruits of the
scheme, see, e.g., United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), the Supreme Court appar-
ently relaxed this requirement in Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989) (in a
scheme to sell wholesale cars with rolled-back odometers, the victim retailers' mailings of
title application forms was sufficient to bring the scheme within the mail fraud statute).
The breadth of the mail fraud statute has been further enlarged by the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 that extends its provisions to schemes involving
private interstate carriers, such as Federal Express. Title XXV, § 250002. Finally, federal
prosecutors' ability to bring fraud cases is further complemented by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343
(wire fraud) and 1344 (bank fraud) (1994).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1988) (making it a crime to receive, possess, or transport a
firearm or any part of it if it was involved in interstate commerce before coming into de-
fendant's possession). See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977) (holding that
proof that the possessed firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce is sufficient to
satisfy required nexus between the possession of firearm by the convicted felon and com-
merce under Omnibus Crime Act); Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976) (holding
that statute applies to a convicted felon's intrastate retail purchase of a firearm when the
firearm had been manufactured out of state). Another provision of the statute, § 922(g),
punishes firearms possession in schools with no requirement of a federal jurisdictional ele-
ment. The Fifth Circuit found that provision unconstitutional on that ground. United
States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), aftd, No. 93-1260, 1995 WL 238424 (U.S., Apr.
26, 1995).
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-894 (1988). Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971), held
that Congress intended this statute to reach even purely intrastate extortionate credit
transactions.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1988). This statute prohibits gambling businesses that are illegal
under state law and involve at least five persons, if the business continues for 30 days or
generates $2,000 in a single day. The statute requires no proof of an effect on interstate
commerce and has been upheld as applied to purely intrastate activities. See United States
v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Riehl, 460 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1972);
United States v. Harris, 460 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1972); Schneider v. United States, 459 F.2d
540 (8th Cir. 1972).
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 201 (1988) (bribery of federal officials), 1951-52 (1988) (Hobbs Act),
1961-63 (1988) (RICO). See Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992) (applying
§ 1951 to bribery of state officials); United States v. Kelly, 36 F.3d 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(convicting two U.S. Agency for International Development officials under § 201 for re-
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every drug deal, no matter how small,8 even the simple possession of
user-amounts of controlled substances.9
Recently, this trend has accelerated. In the past three years, Con-
gress has enacted criminal statutes to deal with a variety of politically
high-profile misconduct, including anti-abortion violence,'0 carjack-
ing," failure to pay child support,12 and even "animal rights terror-
ism."'3 The 1994 Crime Bill enacted a long list of additional new
offenses, including domestic violence,' 4 providing material support to
terrorists,15 telemarketing fraud,16 interstate computer hacking,' 7 mis-
use of credit cards and ATM cards,' 8 possession of handguns by
juveniles,19 art theft,20 and obstructing a lawful hunt.21
Even today, federal crimes are not completely comprehensive.
There are still gaps in coverage. For example, federal law does not
reach murders that do not involve a federal officer, a federal territory,
the use of interstate travel or communication facilities, and were not
ceiving kickbacks from contractors); United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1351 (7th Cir.
1988) (convicting state trial judge under the Hobbs Act and RICO for soliciting in arrang-
ing loans from lawyers representing parties before his court); United States v. Jannotti, 673
F.2d 578, 595-96 (3d Cir. 1982) (convicting city council members under Hobbs Act for
accepting bribes); United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 538 (5th Cir. 1982) (convicting
state commissioner of agriculture under Hobbs Act and RICO for soliciting bribes);
United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411, 418 (6th Cir. 1980) (convicting county officials under
Hobbs Act for taking bribes from land developers).
8. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1988) (making possession of a controlled substance with intent
to distribute a crime without regard to quantity). See, eg., United States v. Schuster, 948
F.2d 313, 315 (7th Cir. 1991) ("This Court has consistently held that the quantity of drugs
involved in a narcotics case does not constitute a substantive element of the drug of-
fense."); United States v. Sotelo-Rivera, 931 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Section
841(a) does not specify drug quantity as an element of the substantive offense of possession
with intent to distribute .... "); United States v. Campuzano, 905 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir.
1990) ("Section 841(a) ... prohibits the distribution of any amount of cocaine and in no
way requires proof of a particular quantity ....").
9. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
10. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat.
694 (1994) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1993).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (Supp. V 1993).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 43 (Supp. V 1993).
14. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 40221, 108 Stat. 1796, 1925 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2261).
15. § 120005, 108 Stat. at 2022 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A).
16. § 250001, 108 Stat. at 2081-85 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2325).
17. § 290001, 108 Stat. at 2097-99 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)).
18. § 250007, 108 Stat. at 2087-88 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)).
19. § 110201, 108 Stat. at 2010-12 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)).
20. § 320902, 108 Stat. at 2124 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3294).
21. § 320802, 108 Stat. at 2121.
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committed in order to gain entrance into, maintain, or increase the
defendant's position in a criminal enterprise. O.J. Simpson, for exam-
ple, could not have been prosecuted in federal court. Similarly, most
assaults not involving federal officers or enclaves and unrelated to en-
terprise crime are beyond the reach of federal authorities.
Notwithstanding these lacunae, federal criminal jurisdiction is
fast becoming the rule rather than the exception. One way or an-
other, federal statutes reach most major malefactions and many minor
ones, and there is no realistic prospect of reversing that trend. It is
therefore increasingly anachronistic to speak of the federalization of
crime as if it were chiefly a function of the substantive law. Today,
federal prosecutors have substantive authority to pursue most crimes
worth pursuing. It follows that the federalization of crime is increas-
ingly in the hands of federal prosecutors and that informed debate on
the respective state and federal roles in law enforcement should focus
on the prosecutive function.
We believe that organized crime (broadly defined) is an espe-
cially appropriate target for federal prosecution. As we describe be-
low, federal prosecutors enjoy advantages that their state and local
counterparts do not possess. Nowhere can the advantages of federal
prosecution be employed more productively than in the attack on
criminal gangs and enterprises. In our opinion, the prosecution of or-
ganized crime should be largely federalized.
L. Constraint and Discretion
The most important constraint on federal prosecution is re-
sources. In 1990 the total budget for federal prosecution and legal
services was more than $1.5 billion. 22 Twenty years earlier, that figure
was only slightly over $100 million. Even when these figures are ad-
justed for the effect of inflation, federal prosecution dollars have more
than tripled. The corresponding expansion in the effective scope of
federal prosecution is obvious-and probably more consequential
than any change in the substantive law during that period.
Despite the increase in these funds, federal prosecutors are only a
small fraction of the nation's supply. In 1990 the total budgetary com-
mitment to state and local prosecution was nearly $4 billion.23 The
federal government therefore provides slightly more than one-quarter
22. KATHLEEN MAGUIRE ET AL., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUST-ICE STATISTICS
1993, at 2 (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics).
23. Id. at 4 tbl. 1.4.
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of the total national prosecution expenditures, and much of that is
devoted to support services for both federal and state authorities.
Moreover, the number of federal prosecutors is small compared to
their state and local counterparts, comprising roughly ten percent of
the national total.24 Thus, no matter how widely Congress casts the
net of federal crimes, most criminal activity will continue to be han-
dled by state and local authorities. At the same time, federal prosecu-
tors have a growing share of the nation's prosecution resources and
may be expected to exercise a growing share of the nation's
prosecutions.
As a general matter, the selection of targets and defendants by
federal prosecutors is a local function. Rarely are such choices di-
rected centrally by the Attorney General. Of course, federal prosecu-
tors are influenced by broad policy initiatives and specific
enforcement programs 26 emanating from Washington, but United
States Attorneys are explicitly vested with "plenary authority" over
prosecutions in their districts and retain a large freedom to devise
their own strategies. 27
It is a mistake, however, to assume that prosecutors' strategies
reflect nothing more than their own preferences. Differences in local
needs sometimes explain variations that otherwise appear anomalous.
For example, in 1992, the Southern District of California successfully
prosecuted two hundred reported cases of simple drug possession,
while the neighboring Central District of California had only two such
cases.28 The Southern District, however, has something its neighbor
to the north does not: a border with Mexico. In southern California,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service stops more than 500,000
24. NoRMAN ABRAMs & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CnmsiNAL LAW ANM ITS EN-
FORCEMENT 8, 12 (2d ed. 1993) (reporting that in 1992 there were 2,748 United States
Attorneys and Assistants, as compared to more than 25,000-30,000 state and local prosecu-
tors); BuREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS 1992, at 2 (1993)
(of the total workforce of approximately 57,000 in state and local prosecutors' offices, more
than 1/3, or about 21,000, were assistant prosecuting attorneys).
25. UNITED STATES A-roRNcys' BU.EmN, (U.S. Dep't of Justice), Nov. 15, 1993, at
380-81.
26. See e.g., United States v. Madkins, 994 F.2d 540, 542 (8th Cir. 1993) (bringing
prosecution for possession of firearm under the Attorney General's "Triggerlock" project);
United States v. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355, 1357 (4th Cir. 1993) (same); Trace Thompson, Gun
Crimes Targeted by Prosecutors: National Effort Seen as Partly Political, WASH. POST, Apr.
11, 1991, at A14; Thornburgh Orders Drive on Gun Violence, N.Y. Trmns, Mar. 27, 1991, at
A20.
27. 7 DEPARTmENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-2.000 (1994).
28. H. Scott Wallace, The Drive to Federalize Is a Road to Ruin, 8 CRim. JUST. 12
(1993).
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illegal aliens at the border each year.29 Although all of these persons
could be prosecuted, most are simply deposited back across the bor-
der. Those carrying illegal drugs are treated more severely, and po-
tential felony charges of importation or possession with intent to
distribute are routinely bargained into guilty pleas to misdemeanor
charges of simple possession. Local law enforcement authorities, who
are generally neither inclined nor equipped to handle drug cases in
numbers so disproportionate to the size of the local population, regard
policing the border as primarily a federal problem. Thus, along the
border low-level drug cases that in most jurisdictions routinely are re-
ferred to local prosecutors must be processed federally or not at all.
Additionally, many federal prosecutors feel the need to accom-
modate federal law enforcement agencies in routine matters of federal
interest. Postal workers who steal mail, narcotics suppliers, taxpayers
who try to bribe revenue agents, and thieves who steal truckloads of
airport freight are a few examples of the many cases in which federal
law enforcement agencies have such a clear and longstanding mandate
that it would be politically infeasible to decline federal prosecution.
Besides, given the breadth of federal venue, a failure to service the
bread-and-butter of federal law enforcement agencies would only in-
duce them to shop their high-impact cases elsewhere.
Beyond responding to obvious local needs and servicing federal
law enforcement, United States Attorneys have substantial discretion
to direct their energies where they see fit. Resulting disparities in the
treatment of similarly situated criminals may be characterized as un-
fair,30 but these disparities are not uniquely federal. It is true that a
marijuana smuggler is far better off getting caught by federal authori-
ties in the drug-choked Eastern District of New York, where federal
prosecution is declined when less than a ton is involved, than in West
Virginia, for example, where apparently no amount is too small to
warrant prosecution.31 But similar disparities arise in and among the
states. A defendant in New York state has always been better off
committing an assault in Brooklyn, where such offenses are routine
and are often plea-bargained down to disorderly conduct, than in a
29. Robert Reinhold, California's Tide of Illegal Aliens Ebbs, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 9,
1994, § 1, at 16 (noting that the number of illegal aliens intercepted while trying to cross
the border into California dropped by 6% from the preceding year to 531,689).
30. See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 28, at 52 ("The growing federal/state gap also fosters
arbitrariness of punishment, which frustrates deterrence and devastates the balance of jus-
tice and fairness that citizens have a right to expect in the administration of the law.").
31. See United States v. Bernard, 757 F.2d 1439 (4th Cir. 1985) (prosecution for pos-
session of one pound of marijuana).
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sleepy upstate hamlet, where prosecutors react more harshly.32 The
truth is that disparate treatment exists within any criminal enforce-
ment system-federal or state-in which limited resources are
deployed in accord with local priorities.
What is unique about federal prosecutors-and insufficiently re-
marked-is that their discretionary agendas and enforcement strate-
gies effectively determine the scope of federal law vis-a-vis the states.
The limits set by the substantive law are so relaxed as to be almost
irrelevant. If, for example, federal prosecutors wanted to stamp out
late-night robberies of convenience stores, they would have the au-
thority to try.3 3 That such crimes remain the province of state law is
not a matter of legislative coercion but of prosecutorial choice. It fol-
lows that the right place to locate a debate about the federalization of
crime is not the text of federal statutes, whether enacted or proposed,
but the resources and priorities of federal prosecutors. Within the
constraints imposed by resources, the scope and content of federal
criminal law are determined chiefly by prosecutorial selection.
H. Organized Crime
The crucial questions regarding the federalization of crime are
therefore: What do federal prosecutors prosecute? What should they
prosecute?
One answer is that federal prosecutors should-and probably
do-bring cases in which there is a comparative advantage in federal
prosecution. This statement is true but hugely uninformative. Such
vacuities aside, it is probably not possible to give a global answer.
There are too many differences among districts, too many competing
perceptions of federal interest, and too many difficulties in assembling
data about prosecutorial choice to support sweeping generalizations.
In one large and important area, however, we think there is a reason-
ably clear answer to what federal prosecutors prosecute and-more
controversially-to what they should prosecute. They should and do
prosecute "organized crime."
We put the phrase in quotes to signal that we mean to reach be-
yond the paradigm of La Cosa Nostra families to include the full
range of group criminality involving violence. Thus, "organized
crime" as we use the phrase (we now drop the quotes) also includes
32. Cf. Tamar Lewin, Who Decides Who Will Die? Even Within States, It Varies, N.Y.
TnAms, Feb. 23, 1995, at 1 (describing impact of local sentiment about the death penalty).
33. See supra note 2.
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drug-dealing street gangs, Jamaican "posses," Chinese tongs, and
other criminal organizations. Although some organized crime groups
are interstate or even international in character, that feature is not
essential to the case for federal prosecution. A gang that sells drugs in
an urban housing project may never operate outside that project, yet
still be the proper target of federal law enforcement, particularly if it
terrorizes the residents with repeated threats or violence. The same is
true of many Asian gangs, which typically limit their extortion activi-
ties to their own communities.
Nor is federal prosecution of organized crime justified by reluc-
tance on the part of local prosecutors. To the contrary, most district
attorneys are elected officials,34 and there are few events more attrac-
tive to elected officials than the press conference following a crime
boss's arrest,35 or the celebration in the streets when a Jamaican
"posse" is removed from a neighborhood.3 6 Indeed, many urban dis-
trict attorneys have established elite units within their offices (in New
York City they are called Rackets Bureaus37) for the sole purpose of
investigating and prosecuting such cases.
Moreover, the building blocks of the typical organized crime case
are almost always crimes that state and local authorities have tradi-
tionally prosecuted. Murder is chief among them, and until the 1980s
was rarely prosecuted in federal court. The same is true for armed
robberies, arsons, assaults, and other ingredients of organized crime.
Thus, the broad category of organized crime includes activities that
state and local prosecutors typically wish to prosecute and that histori-
cally have been prosecuted by them. Why then, should and do federal
prosecutors devote their limited resources to these cases?
34. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS 1992, at 2
(1993) (more than 95% of state and local prosecutors are elected).
35. See, e.g., Scott Ladd, Gotti Arrested on 2 Charges, NEWSDAY, Jan. 24, 1989, at 4;
Selwyn Rabb, Gotti Is Seized in '86 Shooting of Union Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1989, at
B1.
36. David Kocieniewski, Raids Break Up Drug Ring, But Leader Escapes, NEWSDAY,
Dec. 8, 1990, at 4 (reporting on the day after the arrest of the "Gulleyman posse," a group
of violent Jamaican narcotics traffickers, that residents of Brooklyn's Crown Heights com-
munity "cheered as police led suspects away"). Cf. Raids Break Up Drug Ring, But Leader
Escapes, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 19, 1994, at 20 (describing the "scores of residents... out
on the streets. . . ,cheering the police like a liberating army" after arrest of thugs active in
a housing project).
37. Peg Tyre, DA Declares War on Mob in Queens, NEWSDAY, June 21, 1991, at 3
(reporting that Queens District Attorney establishes Rackets Bureau to investigate and
prosecute the Mafia and Asian and Columbian organized crime groups).
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The answer is that federal prosecutors do a better job. Several
features of federal law combine to give federal prosecutors enormous
advantages over their state and local counterparts, especially those in
New York. Nowhere are these advantages more pronounced than in
the investigation and prosecution of organized crime. For a variety of
reasons-many of which seem unconnected to the usual debates
about federalism-federal prosecutors can conduct organized crime
investigations more quickly, bring more charges, and win more convic-
tions than state and local authorities. The chief purpose of this paper
is to describe those advantages.
Additionally, we have a (rather limited) normative aspiration.
For the most part, we think the advantages that federal prosecutors
enjoy under federal law over their state counterparts are desirable-
the chief exception being the severity of the federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Full-scale defense of that proposition would require a
whole series of law review articles on various features of federal law.
Considerations of time and expertise counsel against so ambitious an
undertaking. We do mean here, however, to advance for discussion a
narrower normative claim: The advantages of federal prosecution
under current law can nowhere be so usefully employed as in the at-
tack on organized crime. Given current law, we think organized crime
not only is, but should be, largely federalized.
IHi. The Advantages of Federal Prosecution
What are the advantages of federal prosecution? One, of course,
is the main legislative tool for reaching group criminality, the Racket-
eer Influence Corrupt Organizations Act.38 A great deal has been
written about the role of RICO in combating organized crime.39 If we
slight that topic here, it is not because of its unimportance, but be-
cause it has been so well covered elsewhere. Moreover, we think the
prominence of RICO has distracted attention from other important
features of federal law. After all, many states have enacted provisions
38. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
39. See generally G. Robert Blakey, Foreword to Symposium: Law and the Continu-
ing Enterprise.: Perspectives on RICO, 65 NorE DAME L. REv. 873, 880-81 (1990) (citing
sources on the effectiveness of RICO against organized crime); Gerard E. Lynch, RICO:
The Crime of Being a Crimina4 Parts I and 11, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661 (1987) (describing
use of RICO in attacking criminal enterprises); Selwyn Raab, A Battered and Ailing Mafia
Is Losing Its Grip on America, N.Y. TrmEs, Oct. 22, 1990, at A12 (describing long-term
strategy to use RICO against top Mafia leaders).
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similar to RICO.40 Yet even in those states, there are important, but
little-noticed advantages of federal prosecution. They range from the
use of accomplice testimony and federal grand jury practice to the
federal Sentencing Guidelines. A survey of these advantages supports
the decision of federal prosecutors to direct their resources against
organized crime.
A. Accomplice Testimony
One characteristic of organized crime is that the most culpable
and dangerous individuals rarely do the dirty work. Although the or-
ganization's leaders are ultimately responsible for its crimes, they typi-
cally deal through intermediaries and limit their own participation to
behind-the-scenes control and guidance. Consequently, their guilt
usually cannot be proved by the testimony of victims or eyewitnesses
or by forensic evidence. And they never confess. Generally speaking,
successful prosecution of organized crime leaders requires the use of
accomplice testimony. It is therefore enormously important to federal
prosecutors that a federal defendant can be convicted on the uncor-
roborated testimony of an accomplice. Although the jury is cautioned
to use care in evaluating the testimony of accomplices, it is also told
that in an appropriate case it may convict solely on that basis.
41
In contrast, in New York state courts, "[a] defendant may not be
convicted of any offense upon the testimony of an accomplice unsup-
ported by corroborative evidence tending to connect the defendant
with the commission of such offense. ' 42 The requirement is strict. In-
dependent evidence of the defendant's presence at the scene of the
crime does not necessarily suffice, nor does proven falsity of the de-
fendant's alibi.43 Most importantly, the corroboration requirement
cannot be satisfied by the testimony of other accomplices. Thus, not
only is a single accomplice's testimony insufficient, but the interlock-
ing testimony of several accomplices is also insufficient, no matter
40. In New York, for example, the Organized Crime Control Act, N.Y. Penal Law
§ 460 (McKinney 1989), is patterned closely after RICO. See generally Lisa Barsoomian,
Note, Rico "Pattern" Before and After H.J. Inc.: A Proposed Definition, 40 AM. U. L. REv.
919, 948 n.204 (1991) (referencing 27 state statutes modeled after RICO).
41. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,495 (1917); United States v. Gordon,
987 F.2d 902, 906 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 767 (2d Cir. 1965).
See also Jon 0. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt," 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 979, 999 (1993)
(arguing that courts do not take seriously their obligation to assess sufficiency of evidence
in light of the "reasonable doubt" standard in conspiracy cases).
42. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 60.22 (McKinney 1989).
43. See People v. Moses, 472 N.E.2d 4, 8-9 (N.Y. 1984).
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how corroborative the accomplices may be of one another.44 Similar
rules are in effect in sixteen other states, including California.45
As a result, many strong cases cannot be brought in state court.
Organized crime cases tend to be "historical" in focus, involving
murders, extortions, narcotics deals, and other criminal acts that oc-
curred long before the indictment. As has been noted, there is often
no forensic evidence, no eyewitness linking the defendant and the
crime scene, and no confession. Yet many of these cases are neverthe-
less strong because multiple accomplices testify consistently about the
criminal organization and the crime. In such a case, a murder charge
may rest solely on consistent description of the details of the murder:
the reasons for it, the order to commit it, the way it was done, and the
disposition of the body.46 An important technique in investigating
and prosecuting such cases is to keep these accomplices, who are usu-
ally in custody, separate from one another and so insulated from the
rest of the proof that they can truthfully testify that they are unaware
of the other evidence in the case. Then the prosecutor can argue that
the defendant is either guilty or the unluckiest person in history be-
cause the witnesses who supposedly concocted a story to frame him
just so happened to arrive independently at the same facts.
That argument, of course, is not the final battleground. No mat-
ter how well accomplices have been quarantined, there is always a link
among them-the prosecution team. Defense attorneys frequently
are forced to argue, explicitly or implicitly, that the accomplice wit-
nesses have told a conveniently consistent story because the govern-
ment put them up to it. And therein lies one of the most dramatic
44. See People v. O'Farrell, 67 N.E. 588, 589 (N.Y. 1903); Matter of Cindy "JJ," 484
N.Y.S.2d 249, 250 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); People v. Chamberlain, 329 N.Y.S.2d 61, 68
(N.Y. App. Div. 1972).
45. See Christine J. Saverda, Accomplices in Federal Court A Case for Increased Evi-
dentiary Standards, 100 YALE L.J. 785, 791 nn.40-41 (1990). Eleven of these states have
endorsed the rule that one accomplice cannot corroborate the testimony of another. See
Miller v. State, 275 So. 2d 675, 677 (Ala. 1973); Olles v. State, 542 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Ark.
1976); People v. Belton, 591 P.2d 485, 497 (Cal. 1979); State v. Jones, 873 P.2d 122, 131
(Idaho 1994) (citing IDAHo CODE § 19-2117); State v. Horn, 282 N.W.2d 717, 731 (Iowa
1979); State v. Ouk, 516 N.W.2d 180, 186 (Minn. 1994); LaPena v. State, 544 P.2d 1187,
1194-95 (Nev. 1976); Bowie v. State, 816 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991); State v.
Banks, 486 P.2d 584, 587 (Or. Ct. App. 1971); State v. Wiegers, 373 N.W.2d 1, 16 (S.D.
1985); Moron v. State, 779 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). There is in only one
state clear authority for the opposite view-that one accomplice can corroborate the testi-
mony of another. See Ledbetter v. State, 418 S.E.2d 57, 59-60 (Ga. 1992).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Orena, 32 F.3d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that the
evidence of a crime boss's involvement in a murder was the testimony of two accomplices
who helped bury the body).
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advantages of the federal system: If the investigating agents and law-
yers have been careful, an accomplice-based case can be made to
hinge not on the credibility of the inherently unreliable accomplices,
but on the jury's assessment of the integrity of the prosecutors. Fed-
eral prosecutors usually win such cases.47 Because of the corrobora-
tion requirement, many state prosecutors cannot even attempt to
prosecute them.
The ability to rely solely on accomplice testimony, in conjunction
with the RICO statute, also allows federal prosecutors to bring
charges in cases that are not so strong. Although federal prosecutions
are rarely based solely on the testimony of a single accomplice, com-
ponent parts of prosecutions frequently rely on accomplice testimony
that is wholly uncorroborated, even by the testimony of another ac-
complice. It is not unusual for a RICO indictment to include several
murders as racketeering acts. Three accomplices might be called to
testify about one or more of the murders, corroborating each other as
described above. If one of those accomplices can testify to a separate
murder in which he and a defendant participated, that murder will
often be included in the pattern of racketeering activity, and may also
be alleged as a separate count under 18 U.S.C. § 1959. The prosecutor
can then argue that one of the reasons the jury should believe the sole
accomplice on that charge is because the rest of his testimony is so
well corroborated on the other charges.
Additionally, the prosecutor can argue that an accomplice who is
unaware of the other evidence (or the lack thereof) has a selfish rea-
son not to fabricate testimony. If the accomplice makes things up, his
testimony could conflict with other evidence, and the trial judge, who
usually will determine the accomplice's sentence, will see that he is a
liar and treat him accordingly. Those arguments have proven effec-
tive, and defendants have been convicted of murder in federal court
when the only evidence of their participation in the crime was the
assertion of an accomplice. 48
47. See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Amato, 15 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1994).
48. In the case of mob boss John Gotti, for example, the only evidence of Gotti's
participation in what the defense characterized as the centerpiece crime-the spectacular
murder of former Gambino Family Boss Paul Castellano-was the testimony of Gotti's
former Underboss, Salvatore Gravano. With respect to three other murders, Gravano's
testimony was corroborated by Gotti himself in taped conversations. With respect to the
murder of Castellano, however, there was no such corroboration. Indeed, on the tapes
Gotti denied any involvement in the Castellano murder, yet the jury, relying on Gravano's
otherwise reliable testimony, nevertheless found Gotti guilty. United States v. Gotti, 90
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At first glance, the difference between the federal and the state
approach to accomplice testimony is difficult to fathom. The federal
rule seems a natural corollary of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Because the government cannot compel a
defendant to account for his own behavior, it must prove its case using
sources of evidence other than the defendant himself. Against this
background, it seems illogical to place off limits the next best source:
the defendant's colleagues in the crime. The concern that an accom-
plice has incentives to fabricate testimony against the defendant is
equally applicable in state and federal courts.
The different approach to accomplice testimony in state court
makes sense, however, when considered in the context of the proto-
typical state prosecution, which focuses on a discrete, isolated criminal
act. If a robbery prosecution consists solely of one robber testifying
that he committed the crime with the defendant, a rule forbidding a
conviction is eminently defensible, and may even be unnecessary, as
most juries would not convict on such a presentation.
On the other hand, organized crime cases place in clear relief the
appropriateness of the federal approach to accomplice testimony.
Even if it is uncorroborated with respect to a particular criminal act,
such testimony usually has a richly detailed context, which assists the
jury in making its credibility determination. There may be extensive
evidence, for example, that the criminal organization regularly met at
a particular location and that the witness and the defendant were ob-
served there together. The rules of the organization may help estab-
lish that the witness was in a position to know about the type of
criminal act at issue or may even establish a motive for the defendant
to have committed the offense.
Put another way, it is one thing to allow a conviction based on the
simple assertion of a criminal that the defendant was his colleague in a
crime and quite another to allow it when it has also been demon-
strated that the witness and the defendant are colleagues in a criminal
organization and that they frequently interacted in the context of that
organization and that the crime at issue is the type of crime that the
organization commits. Strictly speaking, the latter testimony is not
"corroborated"; but as a practical matter, depending on the witness's
demeanor, it may nevertheless be quite compelling.49 Because the
C.R. 1051 (S-i) (ILG) (E.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1645 (1994).
49. The Gotti case, see supra note 48, is an excellent example. Although Gotti's par-
ticipation in the Castellano homicide was established solely on the testimony of the accom-
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overwhelming majority of state prosecutions do not provide this type
of context for accomplice testimony, the corroboration requirement in
many state courts is not unreasonable. Similarly, the absence of such
a requirement in federal court does not mean that simple federal pros-
ecutions alleging discrete crimes are based solely on accomplices. In-
deed, that virtually never happens, because juries are naturally
skeptical of such testimony. However, the more permissive federal
rule has tremendous significance in the organized crime setting, where
the context in which "uncorroborated" testimony is given may render
it far more palatable to a jury. The inability to offer such evidence is a
source of great frustration to state and local prosecutors and a com-
pelling reason to bring federal prosecutions against organized crime.
B. The Federal Grand Jury
A federal grand jury investigation may be commenced any time a
prosecutor chooses. A formal allegation that a crime has occurred is
not required; an anonymous tip or rumor may suffice. Indeed, an in-
vestigation may be commenced simply to provide assurance that the
law has not been violated.50
Once an investigation has begun, the powers of the federal grand
jury are enormous (and therefore controversial). The grand jury has
nationwide subpoena power over persons and documents, and the
Supreme Court has protected the unimpeded use of that power.51 In
order to insulate such investigations from delay, a motion to quash a
grand jury subpoena on grounds of relevance must be denied unless
the movant can satisfy the virtually insurmountable burden of showing
that there is no "reasonable possibility" that the witness or documents
will "produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand
jury's investigation. '52
plice Gravano, the other evidence included (1) tape recordings establishing that Gravano
was Gotti's underboss; (2) hundreds of videotapes of them walking in front of their social
club/headquarters and whispering in each other's ear; (3) tape recordings establishing that
Gotti hated Castellano; and (4) tape recordings of Gotti stating that he believed, shortly
before the murder occurred, that he was about to be killed by Castellano. Thus, while
Gravano's testimony that Gotti participated in the murder did not meet the state law cor-
roboration requirement, the organized crime context provided ample indicia of reliability.
50. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991).
51. Id. at 297-302; see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (grand
jury "may compel the production of evidence on the testimony of witnesses it considers
appropriate, and its operation is generally unrestrained by the technical procedural and
evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials").
52. Id. at 301.
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For the same reason, among others, the grand jury may hear evi-
dence that would be inadmissible at trial.53 Consequently, federal
prosecutors routinely present hearsay to grand juries. Indeed, the evi-
dence of accomplice witnesses, civilian eyewitnesses, and victims is
usually recounted by a federal agent who is familiar with the wit-
nesses' statements. So long as the grand jurors are not misled as to
the hearsay nature of the evidence and are aware of their right to
request that the witnesses appear, they may return an indictment
based entirely on hearsay.5 4
The broad subpoena powers of the grand jury are enforced not
only by laws against perjury and obstruction of justice, but also by the
district court's contempt powers. A witness who, without lawful justi-
fication, refuses to answer questions or provide documents may be
jailed civilly for as long as eighteen months, which is intended to co-
erce compliance with the subpoena.55 That confinement may be fol-
lowed by a criminal prosecution, which is intended to punish
noncompliance and, depending on the underlying offense under inves-
tigation, can lead to a substantial prison term.56 Finally, the prosecu-
tors have at their disposal the federal immunity statute, which can be
used to compel testimony in exchange for use immunity and which
does not protect the witness from prosecution for perjury, obstruction
of justice, or contempt.5 7
In these and other respects, federal grand jury practice is stacked
in favor of the prosecution and is often attacked on that ground.58 On
the other hand, prosecutorial control of the grand jury proceedings
53. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (allowing grand jury questions
based on illegally seized evidence); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (holding
defendant may be indicted solely on hearsay evidence).
54. See Costello, 350 U.S. at 363. See also United States v. Diaz, 922 F.2d 998, 1006
(2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Alexander, 789 F.2d 1046, 1048 (4th Cir. 1986). Some
courts have suggested that the use of hearsay be limited. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz,
478 F.2d 408, 410-11 (5th Cir. 1973).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1988).
56. See United States v. Remini, 967 F.2d 754,756 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying Sentencing
Guideline for obstruction of justice to a criminal contempt).
57. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
58. See, e.g., Peter Aranella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury arid the State Prelimi-
nary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MicH. L. REv. 463 (1980)
(criticizing the grand jury for "rubber stamping" prosecutive decisions); William H. Camp-
bell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. Cum. L. & CRIMIoLOGY 174 (1973) (arguing that the
grand jury is the prosecutor's alter ego and should be abolished); Tom WoLFE, THE BON-
E OF THE VAarrrEs 603 (quoting the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals as
saying that "a grand jury would 'indict a ham sandwich' if that's what [the prosecutor]
wanted").
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may perhaps be defended as necessary and inevitable at the investiga-
tive stage, with careful protection of the rights of the accused rele-
gated to the trial.59 However one resolves the overall debate, this
much is clear: The distinctive features of the federal grand jury give it
a peculiarly important role in the investigation of organized crime.
In many instances a grand jury will be impaneled at the outset of
an investigation and provided with background material about the tar-
get group. Such material may consist of informant information, prior
electronic surveillance tapes, transcripts of related accomplice testi-
mony at previous trials, and physical surveillance summaries. As the
investigation proceeds, the prosecutors will use the grand jury as an
investigative tool. In the proactive, covert phase of the investigation,
the grand jury's actions can be coordinated with other investigative
techniques. A subpoena for a witness or for documents may be served
at a location in which a "bug" is in place, stimulating conversations
about the subpoena. Since most criminal organizations monitor grand
jury proceedings closely, a prosecutor can rely on the fact that ques-
tions posed to certain witnesses will be reported back to the targets of
the investigation. These events sometimes produce evidence of how
criminal groups use "house counsel" to subordinate the interests of an
individual client to the interests of the organization60 and, more im-
portantly, often constitute obstructions of justice that later become
racketeering acts and independent counts in the eventual
indictment. 61
It is not uncommon for federal grand juries to sit for up to three
years62 and to return a series of indictments of members of a crime
organization. And the role of the grand jurors is sometimes surpris-
ingly active. During the course of a long investigation, there may be
59. See, e.g., Thomas P. Sullivan & Robert D. Nachman, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It:
Why the Grand Jury's Accusatory Function Should Not Be Changed, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1047 (arguing that the federal grand jury can fulfill the accusatory function
better than proposed alternatives); Ronald F. Wright, Why Not Administrative Grand Ju-
ries?, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 465 (1992) (urging recreation of administrative grand juries).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 552, 555-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (dis-
qualifying defense counsel for, among other reasons, suggesting that one member of the
Gambino Family pled guilty to save the others the trouble of appearing as witnesses at his
trial).
61. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Coiro, 922 F.2d 1008, 1012-13 (2d Cir. 1991) (ob-
struction of justice charges based on house counsel's coaching of witnesses subpoenaed to
testify falsely before the grand jury).
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 3331 (1988). Special grand juries, which are impaneled pursuant
to § 3331 and frequently used for organized crime investigations, may sit for up to three
years. A grand jury impaneled pursuant to Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure is limited to two years.
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periods of grand jury inactivity, such as when the prosecutors are in
trial on one of the indictments, and periods of intense work, particu-
larly after the investigation (or a part thereof) is no longer secret and
immunized witnesses can be brought before the grand jury. Perhaps
because the grand jurors are not distracted by the intervening trials,
they often remember the testimony of prior witnesses as well as the
prosecutors and can point out connections or themes in the evidence,
suggest helpful follow-up questions and, on occasion, even provide
useful investigative suggestions. In short, in a long-term organized
crime investigation, the prosecution team and the grand jury work as
partners. The prosecutors are in control, but the grand jury is a valua-
ble addition to the investigative effort.
In many state systems, grand juries operate very differently. In
some jurisdictions-notably New York-hearsay is not allowed before
the grand jury, and its usefulness in investigating criminal groups is
therefore severely compromised. More widely, the use of grand juries
is frustrated by the unavailability to state prosecutors of testimony co-
erced by a grant of limited immunity. In both of these respects (as
described more fully below), federal prosecutors enjoy distinct advan-
tages over their state and local counterparts.
(1) The No-Hearsay Rule
Some states, including New York and (less strictly) California, re-
quire the rules of evidence to be followed in the grand jury hearing.63
Although there are narrow exceptions for matters such as forensic evi-
dence and proof of ownership of some types of property, the no-hear-
say rule requires that accomplices, eyewitnesses, and victims appear
personally before the grand jury. The rule makes sense in the ordi-
nary state prosecution, involving a one-on-one confrontation between
a civilian complainant and a defendant charged with assault, robbery,
or some other crime. Many such cases, especially those in which the
victim knows the defendant, drop out of the system due to the lack of
cooperation of the victim. The no-hearsay rule operates to weed out
such cases before indictment. The use of hearsay testimony would al-
low indictment on the arresting officer's recitation of the complain-
63. N.Y. Cau. Paoc. LAW § 190.30 (McKinney 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.6
(West 1985). Similar statutes are in effect in Alaska, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 114; Nevada,
NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 172.135 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1993); and South Dakota, S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-5-15 (1988). See generally Annotation, Grand Jury: Admis-
sion of Hearsay Evidence Incompetent at Trial as Affecting, in the Absence of Statutory
Regulation, Validity of Indictment or Conviction, 37 A.L.R.3d 612 (1971 & Supp. 1994).
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ant's statement, but the exercise would often be pointless. If the
witness fails to appear before the grand jury, the long-term prospects
for the case are bleak, and the defendant should not be indicted.
In contrast, organized crime investigations consider a broad array
of activity over an extended period of time. They are almost never
one witness cases, and even when they are, that witness is an accom-
plice. Although accomplices present many problems, failure to ap-
pear is not one of them; the accomplices are almost always in custody.
Thus, one useful function that the no-hearsay rule serves in ordinary
state prosecutions is simply inapplicable to organized crime
investigations.
The fact that in some states the no-hearsay rule nevertheless ap-
plies has major adverse consequences in state organized crime investi-
gations. For one thing, getting an indictment is far more cumbersome
and time-consuming. Rather than have the agent assigned to the in-
vestigation relay to the grand jury the essence of the testimony of ac-
complices, eyewitnesses, and victims, each of those witnesses must
testify. Since their appearances before the grand jury will produce a
recorded statement of the witness that can be used in later cross-ex-
aminations, a responsible investigative team has to drop everything
and engage in the painstaking process of preparing accomplice wit-
nesses to testify about events that are often several years old and em-
bedded in a life of crime. State prosecutors correctly regard this
requirement as an unnecessary obstacle in the process of indicting or-
ganized crime targets.
The no-hearsay rule also prevents a state grand jury from keeping
up with a fast-moving investigation. In a federal investigation, when
an arrested defendant chooses to cooperate, time is of the essence.
The new defendants identified by the cooperator's information are
often arrested immediately, detained pending trial, and indicted
within the ten-day time limit of the Speedy Trial Act by having a case
agent summarize the accomplice's testimony for the grand jury.
Often, one or more of the new defendants chooses to cooperate, pro-
ducing fresh avenues of investigation and sometimes a new wave of
arrests and indictments. In New York state, defendants must be in-
dicted or released within six days of arrest, and the indictment must be
based on first-hand testimony.64 This is simply not feasible if the ac-
64. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 180.80 (McKinney 1993). The only alternative is to
grant the defendant a preliminary hearing. From the prosecutor's perspective, preliminary
hearings are disastrous. Not only must the accomplice testify personally, but he is subject
to cross-examination by defense counsel.
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complice must be signed to a plea/cooperation agreement, prepared to
testify, and produced in the grand jury. As a result, state prosecutors
cannot follow the natural course of the investigation as well as federal
prosecutors can.
In some organized crime cases, the no-hearsay rule makes indict-
ment impossible. Most civilian witnesses in organized crime investiga-
tions-extortion victims, relatives of murder victims, and chance
eyewitnesses-are extremely reluctant to testify. Often they refuse to
do so even in the secrecy of the grand jury.65 A state prosecutor bur-
dened with the no-hearsay rule cannot get an indictment based on
such a witness, even if the prosecutor intends to dismiss that count if it
proceeds to trial. A federal prosecutor is not so restricted, and the
ability to return the indictment based on hearsay is a valuable tool.
The defendants can be detained pending trial precisely because of
their dangerousness, and once they are off the street, the reluctant
witnesses often feel more secure. Also, the defendants are not likely
to know which, if any, of the various charges in the RICO indictment
may not survive at trial, and the pressure of such a case often causes at
least one of them to cooperate, alleviating the need for the reluctant
civilians to testify at all. In addition, trial may be avoided altogether
by a guilty plea. Indeed, the shakiness of fearful witnesses may induce
the prosecutor to make what appears to the defendants to be an at-
tractive plea offer.
The point is that much can happen after an indictment shakes the
tree of an organized criminal group. The problem with the no-hearsay
rule is that it can sometimes prevent state prosecutors from shaking
the tree at all.
(2) Limited Immunity
Another major advantage of federal grand jury practice is that
federal prosecutors can coerce testimony by granting limited immu-
nity for the use or derivative use of such testimony.66 In many states,
including New York, California, and Illinois, prosecutors can force tes-
timony only by granting transactional immunity,67 which protects the
65. Of course, the prosecutor can compel their testimony by granting immunity, but
many witnesses are so fearful that they would lie. As a practical matter, their fear renders
immunity worthless, as the only thing worse (for the prosecution) than a recalcitrant wit-
ness is one who has falsely exculpated the defendant under oath.
66. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
67. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW §§ 190.40, 50.20 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1993); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 1324, 1324.1 (West 1982); ILi. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, paras. 5/106-1, 106-2
(Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1994). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
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witness from prosecution for any activity mentioned in the immunized
testimony.68 In part for the reasons described below, we think the
federal rule preferable, but again, the question is controversial and
has prompted substantial debate.69
Whatever the overall merits of use-and-derivative-use versus
transactional immunity, the difference between them is especially crit-
ical in organized crime investigations. In the course of such investiga-
tions, a federal prosecutor likely can identify persons in the
organization who are at least witnesses and possibly potential defend-
ants but who cannot be indicted because the evidence against them is
insufficient. An example would be a person who is present for a con-
versation in which a mob boss mentions that he has ordered a particu-
lar murder. As explained below, that person is an ideal candidate for
use-immunity in a federal grand jury.
Members of organized crime generally do not tell the truth in the
grand jury, even when protected by a grant of immunity. Usually,
such witnesses have more to fear from their colleagues if they tell the
truth than from the government if they lie. Thus, even minor organi-
zation members typically do not confess and do not implicate others,
at least not intentionally. The prosecutor should therefore expect that
the immunized testimony will be of little or no investigative use
against the witness. If evidence later becomes available against that
witness, in all likelihood he can be prosecuted for the offense despite
having been given use-and-derivative-use immunity.
That such immunized grand jury testimony does not directly im-
plicate anyone does not mean that it is useless. Often it works as a
prophylactic against fabricated exculpations. A person who, accord-
ing to the government's evidence, overheard a boss discuss a murder
contract is an ideal defense witness. When the government's case is
exposed through discovery and at trial, the defense can call that per-
son to provide exculpatory testimony specifically tailored to rebut the
government's evidence (the defendant never said it, he said it but later
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.11, at 424 (2d ed. 1992) (reporting that although a "substantial
number" of states have moved to use-and-derivative-use immunity, a majority still require
transactional immunity).
68. See generally CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 15.03(c)(1) (3d ed. 1993).
69. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 8.11 (2d ed. 1992) (summarizing arguments on both sides); Kristine Strachan, Self-In-
crimination, Immunity, and Watergate, 56 TEx. L. REV. 791 (1978) (advocating return to
transactional immunity); Symposium on Witness Immunity, 67 J. CGiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
129 (1976) (discussing relative merits of both).
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revoked it, he always talks that way and never really means it, etc.).
In the grand jury setting, however, before the government's evidence
is revealed, the opportunity to provide carefully-crafted exculpatory
evidence is much reduced. Moreover, although these witnesses are
less intimidated than others at the prospect of a perjury prosecution,
they do not want to risk inviting one based on evidence (particularly
electronic surveillance tapes) the government may have. The result is
grand jury testimony littered with the stock answer: "I don't remem-
ber; do you have a tape recording that might refresh my recollection?"
That answer, which every experienced federal organized crime prose-
cutor has heard many times, is designed to avoid implicating col-
leagues in crime and the witness in perjury.
Such answers appear wholly uninformative, but they are in fact
valuable to the prosecution. First, by using the grand jury to investi-
gate potential defenses, the prosecutor has neutralized a prospective
defense witness. Having professed under oath to a profound absence
of recollection, the witness cannot credibly give contrary evidence at
trial. Second, if there really is a tape recording or other compelling
evidence of a conversation that could not plausibly be forgotten (such
as a crime boss discussing a murder contract), the witness may be suc-
cessfully prosecuted for perjury. Third, for every five witnesses who
attempt this tightrope act in an organized crime investigation, there is
at least one who goes to jail for contempt rather than testify. Between
perjury prosecutions and contempts, the grand jury process can pro-
duce the incarceration of significant parts of the criminal enterprise.
Fourth, if it can be proven that the targets of the investigation have
induced the perjury or contempt, the eventual indictment will include
such charges, and this will also be powerful evidence of the targets'
consciousness of guilt of the charges for which they were originally
under investigation. Finally, if subsequent events produce evidence
sufficient to convict the witness of the crime he was called to testify
about, he can prosecuted for that as well.70
70. During the investigation of Gambino Family Boss John Gotti and Underboss Sal-
vatore Gravano, the government questioned "Acting Captain" Paul Graziano at length
under immunity in the grand jury about the murder of Graziano's brother-in-law, Louis
DiBono. A year and one-half later, after Gotti and Gravano had been indicted for that
murder, Gravano became a government witness and informed the government that Gra-
ziano was a participant in the conspiracy to kill DiBono, not just a witness. Graziano was
indicted for that offense and subsequently convicted. See United States v. Conte, 93 CR 85
(ILG) (E.D.N.Y. 1994). See also United States v. Gambino, 90 CR 1051 (S-3) (ILG)
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (convicting Gambino Family captain of racketeering despite having been
immunized and questioned regarding his role in the family); United States v. Montoya, No.
93-50411, 1995 WL 9707, *8 (9th Cir., Jan. 12, 1995) (upholding money laundering convic-
April 1995] FEDERALIZATION OF ORGANIZED CRIME 1115
None of this can be done in a New York state grand jury (or those
of many other states) because, absent a waiver by the witness, New
York law confers transactional immunity on any grand jury witness. 71
Thus, although a state prosecutor has the option to immunize, he or
she must be extremely circumspect in doing so because the immunized
witness will forever be immune from prosecution for any crime "con-
cerning which he gave evidence," truthful or otherwise.72 In most en-
terprise crime investigations, that is simply too risky. These
investigations tend to focus on a large number of overlapping crimes,
and the irrevocable "bath" given the witness is too high a price to pay
in order to neutralize him as a defense witness.
The handicap of not having use-or-derivative-use immunity was
best described by one of the nation's leading prosecutors, New York
County District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau:
New York's transactional immunity rule often makes effective in-
vestigation and prosecution of crime impossible. In short, we can-
not risk conferring transactional immunity on a potential grand jury
witness if there is any possibility that the witness may be involved in
the offense being investigated or any offense which might inadver-
tently be touched upon in the grand jury inquiry. This creates espe-
cially serious problems in cases involving narcotics and organized
crime.73
Despite this testimony, no reform seems likely. Based in part on
the 20,000 member police union's promise that a use-or-derivative-use
tion of defendant who, as an immunized grand jury witness, had denied knowledge about
the leader of the organization and told the government "only what he believed was already
known").
71. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 190.40 & 50.20 (McKinney 1992 & 1993). Despite a
sustained effort by prosecutors and some legislators, the New York Legislature failed to
enact the six use-or-derivative-use immunity bills that were introduced in 1983-1988. The
repeated rejection of this reform owed something to strenuous opposition from a surpris-
ing source. The police, acting through their unions and lobbyists, demanded transactional,
rather than use-or-derivative-use immunity, as a precondition to testifying about investiga-
tive activities. See Paul Browne, DAs Ask End to Total Immunity for Grand Jury Witness,
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 12, 1988, at 1 (noting that the police union feared that narrower immunity
would expose police to prosecution for crimes committed during investigations); Stop Im-
munizing Criminals Against Prosecution, NEWSDAY, May 19, 1988, at 96 (noting that op-
position to use-or-derivative-use immunity comes from civil libertarians and from the
police and opining that "sparing a few cops from just punishment" is not a sufficient reason
to continue transactional immunity).
72. The only limit is that the statute does not immunize the witness from prosecution
for crimes that are "gratuitously given or volunteered by the witness." N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 190.40(2)(b) (McKinney 1993). Thus, the witness cannot blurt out that he killed
Jimmy Hoffa and expect a lifetime pass for it (unless, of course, the prosecutor made the
egregious mistake of asking a question to which the confession was responsive).
73. Letter from Robert M. Morgenthau to Angelo DelToro, Member of the New
York Assembly (on file with Hastings Law Journal).
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immunity statute would make its members "hesitan[t] to vigorously
enforce the law,"74 the long-standing effort to enact such a law has
now come to nothing.
C. Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimum Sentences
In 1984 Congress created the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion to study, among other things, the absence of uniformity in the
sentences of federal defendants and to correct it through the promul-
gation of Sentencing Guidelines. 75 A great deal has been written
about the Sentencing Commission's work, and the Sentencing Guide-
lines continue to be the most controversial area of federal criminal
law. Indeed, the sentencing ranges prescribed by the Guidelines have
caused some district judges to denounce them publicly,76 and one to
resign in protest."
The Sentencing Guidelines took effect on November 1, 1987, and
apply only to offenses committed after that date. The current contro-
versy over the fairness of the Guidelines notwithstanding, the essen-
tial reason for implementing them-that similarly situated defendants
in the federal system were being sentenced very disparately-remains
indisputable. Illustrative are the sentences imposed on the drug couri-
ers arrested on incoming international flights. On any given day, a
handful of poor, uneducated Nigerians with no criminal histories can
be arrested for importation of heroin as the fight from Lagos arrives
at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Before the
Guidelines came into effect, these lowest-level drug defendants, who
in all respects relevant to sentencing were utterly indistinguishable,
were receiving significantly different sentences depending on which
judge was doing the sentencing. This category of cases, and others
74. Patrolmen's Benevolent Association's Memorandum in Opposition to Bill (Nqw
York State Assembly No. 5317) (on file with Hastings Law Journal). See also Legislative
Committee of the Joint Metropolitan Police Conference of New York State, Inc., and Po-
lice Conference of New York, Inc., Agenda for the 1985 Session of the State Legislature, at
10 (opposing elimination of transactional immunity on the perplexing ground that it is not
necessary "if District Attorneys and their investigators do their homework properly...
75. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
76. See e.g., Joseph B. Treaster, N.Y. TmsS, Apr. 17, 1993, at 1 (reporting announce-
ment by senior federal judges Jack B. Weinstein of Brooklyn and Whitman Knapp of Man-
hattan that they would no longer preside over drug cases as a protest against national drug
policies and federal Sentencing Guidelines).
77. See Alan Abrahamson, Judge Quits S.D. Bench over Sentencing Rules, L.A.
Txr=s, Sept. 27, 1990, at Al (reporting that U.S. District Judge J. Lawrence Irving re-
signed, "[s]aying strict federal Sentencing Guidelines had taken much of the fun out of
being a judge").
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like it, simply highlighted what all criminal law practitioners knew to
be the case-that some judges were much tougher than others in im-
posing sentence. So long as the sentences were within the broad statu-
tory range, there was nothing either the government or an unlucky
defendant could do about such disparity.78
The Sentencing Guidelines establish an elaborate mechanism to
prescribe sentences for federal crimes. Judicial discretion, which was
previously limited only by the statutory maximum, has been narrowly
restricted by the creation of sentencing "ranges." Absent extraordi-
nary circumstances justifying a "departure," the court must impose a
sentence within the specified range. Since the ranges are narrow, 79
and their application triggered by the formula specified in the Guide-
lines, federal sentences have become much more predictable. The si-
multaneous abolition of parole made the sentences more certain as
well.80
Although the point is certainly subject to debate,81 the contribu-
tion of the Sentencing Guidelines to regularity, even-handedness, and
consistency in sentencing is, in our opinion, for the better. Less
clearly defensible is the severity of the Guidelines themselves. Many
critics who approve of certainty in sentencing are nevertheless out-
raged (in our view with justification) by the harshness of the author-
ized sentences. 82
78. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,363-66 (1989) (describing federal sen-
tencing prior to the Sentencing Guidelines).
79. The maximum of any sentencing range cannot exceed the minimum by more than
the greater of 25% or six months. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1988).
80. See Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473 (1984) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993)) (abolishing parole for those sentenced under Guidelines).
81. See generally REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS SruDy COMMITrEE (1990) (re-
porting complaints about the rigidity of the Guidelines); Albert A. Alschuler, The Failure
of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHi. L. REv. 901 (1991)
(emphasizing the downside of aggregative, as opposed to individualized, sentencing and
proposing alternative "benchmark" system); Daniel J. Free, Federal Sentencing in the Wake
of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limitations on the Discretion of Sentences, 101 YALE L.J.
1681 (1992) (arguing for greater judicial discretion); Gerhard A. Gesell, Remark, Perspec-
tives on the Judiciary, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 475, 494-95 (1990) (criticizing elimination of
discretion in sentencing); Charles J. Ogletree, Commentary, The Death of Discretion? Re-
flections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1938 (1988) (suggesting
reform to enhance sentencing judges' ability to take wider variety of factors into account);
Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 1992, at 2
("The exercise of discretion by a federal judge at sentencing was not, in my view, ever a
major or irreparable weakness of the federal courts system-it was one of its strengths.").
82. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, Keynote Address, Sentencing Guidelines, A Need for
Creative Collaboration, 101 YALE L.J. 2043, 2046 (1992) (reporting that judges find Guide-
lines both too rigid and too severe); Markus D. Dubber, Book Review, Judicial Positivism
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This argument is essentially political and in any event is beyond
the scope of this Article. Our goal is to examine a narrower point that
has received too little attention: The Sentencing Guidelines empower
prosecutors. Indeed, if federal prosecutors had been asked to create
the sentencing regime that would place the maximum permissible
pressure on criminal defendants to cooperate with the government,
they could hardly have done better than the Sentencing Commission.
The Guidelines have become a valuable tool, used by federal law en-
forcement authorities to turn targets and defendants into accomplice
witnesses. Indeed, in ways that are not widely understood, the Guide-
lines have altered the way federal investigations into organized crime
are conducted and have contributed significantly to the success of
those investigations in recent years.
The Sentencing Commission established only one readily avail-
able escape from these essentially mandatory sentences: cooperation
with the government. Sentencing Guideline section 5K1.1 allows a
district court to "depart" from the applicable guideline range if the
defendant's cooperation has resulted in "substantial assistance" to the
government. There is no limit to the degree of departure; a defendant
whose guideline range is 324 to 405 months may be sentenced to any
lesser term or not incarcerated at all.
Significantly, this type of downward departure requires a motion
from the government. The government has unreviewable discretion in
determining whether to enter into a cooperation agreement and sub-
stantial leeway in determining whether the defendant has complied
with the agreement and rendered the requisite assistance. In effect,
the prosecutor holds the key to the jailhouse door.
At the same time the Sentencing Commission conferred this
power on prosecutors, Congress provided precisely the same escape
mechanism for the extraordinarily severe mandatory minimum
sentences for narcotics offenses. If a defendant is caught trafficking in
fifty grams of crack, one kilogram of heroin, or five kilograms of co-
caine, the government can bring a charge carrying a mandatory mini-
and Hitler's Injustice, 93 COLUM. L. Rv. 1807,1830 (1993) ("The federal sentencing guide-
lines are infamous for their brutal penalties in drug cases. . ."); David Margolick, Full
Spectrum of Judicial Critics Assail Prison Sentencing Guidelines; 5-Year Effort Is Called
Hobgoblin of U.S. Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, at Al (quoting Judge Kleinfeld,
generally a supporter of the Guidelines, as having written that, "I have sometimes felt
compelled [by the Guidelines] to impose a sentence which seemed much too long, and this
has been a very painful event.").
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mum prison term of ten years and a maximum term of life.8 3 This
provision trumps the Guidelines. The small-time crack dealer can sell
ten grams in a matter of minutes. Although the guideline range for
doing so would be thirty to thirty-seven months,84 a person charged
under the statutory mandatory minimum provisions faces ten years
because it is a narcotics offense. A defendant in that situation has
only one way out: The court has authority to sentence below the
mandatory minimum only upon a government motion based on the
defendant's "substantial assistance" to the prosecution. 85
This regime gave an enormous boost to federal law enforcement
generally and, in particular, altered the strategy for investigating or-
ganized crime. Before the Guidelines, it was difficult to "turn" mem-
bers of an organized criminal group. This was especially true during
the investigative phase-that is, before the prospective witness was
indicted. When investigators identified a target of the investigation as
a potential cooperator, their ability to make a persuasive plea offer
was hampered by an undercurrent of uncertainty about the reward for
cooperating. Although sentencing judges generally took cooperation
into account, lenient judges tended to sentence leniently even without
cooperation. Thus, in the investigative setting, when it was not known
which judge would get the case, it was not clear that the benefit attrib-
utable to cooperation would outweigh the substantial costs of becom-
ing a witness in an organized crime case. The fact of parole eligibility
after one-third of any future sentence further blunted the force of
these attempts to turn targets into witnesses.
The new regime allows a federal prosecutor to make a much
stronger pitch. Now a target can be walked through the Guidelines
calculations and shown precisely where he will fall on the Commis-
sion's sentencing chart. The bottom end of that range will be the best
83. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Five grams of crack, 100 grams
of heroin, or 500 grams of cocaine trigger a 5-year mandatory minimum, with a maximum
of 40 years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
84. Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1 establishes a base offense level of 26 for distribut-
ing 10 grams of crack. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2131.1 (Supp. 1994). With a 3-level adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility and a 4-level adjustment for being a minimal participant, a
defendant would have a total level of 19, which carries a range of 30-37 months for a
person with no criminal history. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3E1.1, 3B1.2, 5A (Supp. 1994)
85. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988). In addition, the 1994 Crime Bill eliminated
mandatory minimums for a narrow class of defendants who satisfy the following require-
ments: (1) minimal criminal history; (2) no use or threat of violence or of a dangerous
weapon; (3) no resulting death or serious bodily injury; (4) no management role in the
offense; and (5) provision of truthful information and evidence to the government. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(f) (1994).
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he can possibly do, even before a lenient judge. If he is charged with
narcotics trafficking, he is in an even worse position because even rel-
atively small amounts of drugs can trigger onerous mandatory mini-
mum sentences. In all events, the sentences will be without parole.
The prospective witness will then hear, from both his attorney and the
prosecutor, that the only way out of that position on the chart is to
cooperate with the government. Especially in investigations involving
murder or large amounts of narcotics, in which the guideline ranges
are very high,8 6 the inducement is enormously powerful. It has pro-
duced far more cooperation and accomplice testimony in organized
crime cases than occurred in the pre-Guidelines era.
In effect, the Sentencing Guidelines have added a new dimension
to the federal effort to combat enterprise crime: plea or cooperation
bargaining as an investigative tool. Many investigations reach a point
where further progress requires helpful information from one of the
targets. The investigative team selects a prospective cooperator,
based on a variety of factors, including the strength of the case against
him, an assessment of his ability to endure a lengthy prison term, and
the degree of credibility-damaging baggage he would bring to the wit-
ness stand. The prosecution then offers the prospect the opportunity
to plead guilty, typically to the most serious offense he has committed,
and to testify for the government in exchange for a "substantial assist-
ance motion." This motion is the witness's only means of escape from
the mandatory guideline sentence. The negotiation is done as secretly
as possible, so that the opportunity is preserved for the witness to co-
operate proactively by wearing a "wire" among the rest of the targets.
Even if the cooperation is only historical, as is usually the case in or-
ganized crime investigations, the information that the new witness
provides is often the key to a successful investigation, and the cooper-
ation is usually the direct result of the incentives created by the Sen-
tencing Guidelines.
A final respect in which the federal sentencing regime empowers
prosecutors is superficially paradoxical. While federal law conditions
leniency on prosecutorial initiative, it allows the prosecutor to dele-
gate to the court the task of determining the degree of leniency. The
86. For example, if the defendant was involved in the importation of 20 kilograms of
cocaine, had a managerial role in the organization, and possessed a weapon in connection
with the offense, his guideline range would be at least 262-327 months. 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2D1.1, 3B1.1, 2K2.1, 5a (Supp. 1994). Murder, of course, results in the highest guideline
range-life imprisonment without parole. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2A1.2, 5A (Supp. 1994).
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distinction is critical to the credibility of the accomplice witnesses on
whom most organized crime prosecutions depend.
Of course, a federal prosecutor can confer leniency directly. For
example, the prosecutor can agree not to charge a cooperating witness
or even to grant immunity to that witness. The prosecutor can also
control sentencing by charge bargaining. A major narcotics trafficker,
for example, could be charged with only a four-year "telephone
count"- using a telephone to facilitate a drug deal.87 The effect
would be to restrict judicial discretion to the small range of penalties
authorized for that offense. A third way for prosecutors to control
sentencing is to agree that a specific sentence will be imposed after the
accomplice's testimony,88 although such agreements require court
approval.89
All these options raise a common problem. When the accomplice
testifies, the jury learns that he will receive lenient treatment and that
the terms of that leniency have been set by an interested party-the
government. That fact bolsters the standard defense argument that
the accomplice's willingness to testify in exchange for the prosecutor's
leniency makes him an unreliable witness.
To avoid-or at least to minimize-this difficulty, the most com-
mon plea agreement in organized crime cases requires the witness to
plead guilty to his most serious crime, even if it carries a sentence of
life imprisonment. In return, the accomplice gets only a "substantial
assistance" motion and a report to the court of the nature and value of
the cooperation rendered. This agreement allows the prosecutor to
argue to the jury that any leniency the witness receives will come from
the court, which has no stake in the outcome and which will be lenient
only if justice so requires. When, as is often true, the accomplice has
pleaded guilty to participation in a murder, the prosecutor can say to
the jury that if the witness spends one day less than the rest of his life
in prison, it will be because the court, not the prosecutor, thought that
the right result. Why should the jury not listen to what the accomplice
has to say?
Moreover, this argument is not merely a talking point for the
jury. It also has substance. The accomplice ordinarily will be sen-
tenced by the judge who hears his testimony. Judges are presumably
concerned about the truthfulness of the accomplice's testimony, not
87. 21 U.S.C. § 843(b)-(c) (1988).
88. FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(e)(1)(C).
89. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(2).
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its effectiveness. The result channels the accomplice's selfish motives
into a desire to tell the truth.
Obviously, the scheme collapses if judges do not-or are not
known to-reward cooperation. In fact, judges do reward coopera-
tion, sometimes very generously.90 By creating a system in which the
prosecutor alone can make an accomplice witness eligible for leniency,
but in which the terms of that leniency are determined afterward by
the court, Congress has vastly strengthened the hands of federal pros-
ecutors in dealing with organized crime.
The results have been impressive. As one district judge who has
presided over a series of organized crime cases in recent years has
observed:
Discipline [within the Mafia] has eroded in recent years.... Perhaps
most significantly, the code of silence that sealed the mobs off from
penetration by law enforcement, is dissolving. Members now fre-
quently testify against their associates. For example, at the trials of
these defendants, the juries learned about the operations of La Cosa
Nostra from members of the Colombo family itself, from the former
acting boss of the Luchese family and from the former consigliere of
the Gambino family.91
The court went on to laud the accomplishments of organized crime
investigators: "The increased numbers of members of gangs willing to
testify and the deterioration in the quality of their leadership and
membership does show the utility and efficiency of the tenacious and
sometimes brilliant work of law enforcement agencies." 92 Perhaps
these investigators are as tenacious and as brilliant as is alleged, but
much of the credit for their success goes to the effect of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines.
In this respect more than any other, the Sentencing Guidelines
are the envy of state and local prosecutors. For various reasons, state
90. Salvatore Gravano is a prominent example. Gravano was arrested for various
crimes, including three murders. From the prosecution, he received a 20-year "cap" on his
sentence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(C). After three years of
cooperation, during which Gravano admitted his participation in sixteen additional
murders and assisted in the prosecution of more than three dozen Mafia figures and union
officials, he received a sentence of five years. United States v. Gravano, 90 CR 1051 (S-2)
(ILG) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1994). See also United States v. Ross, 719 F.2d 615, 623 (2d Cir.
1983) (Friendly, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that a court's ability to offer leniency
in return for cooperation is an indispensable tool of law enforcement); United States v.
Milken, No. 89-CR41, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11670, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (conceding the
inequity inherent in the fact "that the worst criminals usually benefit most from coopera-
tion," but stating that "if society did not reward [such] cooperation ... many serious crimes
would be undetected [and] unpunished").
91. United States v. Sessa, 821 F. Supp. 870, 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (Weinstein, 3.).
92. I. at 875.
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systems do not create the same incentive to cooperate. The chief rea-
son is that the control over sentencing given by the Sentencing Guide-
lines to federal prosecutors, about which some federal judges have
complained vehemently, 93 has not been vested in state prosecutors.
Also, contrary to the federal system, in which the judge is forbidden
from participating in plea negotiations,94 state court judges may take
an active role in plea discussions.95 Moreover, state judges often have
interests that are different from those of the prosecutor and even from
those of a federal judge hearing the same type of case. Specifically,
state courts tend to have bone-crushing caseloads, and docket man-
agement becomes an overwhelming concern. Where the prosecutor
may want to demand cooperation in exchange for a lenient sentence,
the court may, quite understandably, be more interested in simply get-
ting the case off its docket.
Consequently state prosecutors in enterprise crime investigations
threaten to bring their evidence against the prospective witness to the
United States Attorney, where the rigors of the Sentencing Guidelines
cannot be avoided without cooperation. Even more frequently, and
despite the district attorneys' desire to prosecute high-proffle cases
themselves, state investigators and prosecutors are teaming up with
federal authorities for the express purpose of bringing organized
crime cases in the prosecution-friendly arena of federal court. In one
recent case, the court noted that the successes combating traditional
organized crime families are the result of the "unrelenting pressure of
hundreds of talented city, state, and federal investigators over many
years. ' '96 Indeed, joint federal and state task forces are now the rule,
93. See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 963-70 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Ed-
wards, J., concurring). Judge Edwards laments that the Guidelines have "placed enormous
power in the hands of the AUSA, effectively 'replacing judicial discretion over sentencing
with prosecutorial discretion."' Id. at 964 (quoting United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d
1084, 1119 (3d Cir. 1990) (Rosenn, J., concurring). Of particular concern to him and some
other judges is the fact that the key to the "substantial assistance" escape from the Guide-
lines has been taken from the judges and given to the prosecutors: "One wonders whether
the guidelines, in transferring discretion from the district judge to the prosecutor, have not
left the fox guarding the chicken coop of sentencing uniformity." Id. at 965 n.5.
94. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1).
95. A state judge may participate in the plea bargaining as long as that participation
does not undermine voluntariness. See, e.g., Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873, 883, 887
(5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (imposing 33-year sentence on defendant to whom judge had
offered a 20-year sentence for pleading guilty held to be insufficient evidence of judicial
vindictiveness). But see Longval v. Meachum, 693 F.2d 236, 238 (1st Cir. 1982) (vacating
sentence when judge made an unsolicited midtrial suggestion that the defendant consider a
plea, and then gave the uncooperative defendant a sentence 37-47 years longer than that
imposed on a plea-bargained codefendant).
96. United States v. Sessa, 821 F. Supp. 870, 875 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
FEDERALIZATION OF ORGANIZED CRIME
rather than the exception, in the investigation of all forms of organ-
ized crime, and the prosecutions resulting from those joint efforts are
virtually always brought in federal court.
Conclusion
The most distinctive feature of federal criminal law is that it has
evolved piecemeal, with overlapping and often inconsistent statutes
passed at different times in response to different national concerns. 97
The 1994 Crime Bill continues this ad hoc expansion of federal crimi-
nal law to embrace common misbehaviors that traditionally were the
exclusive province of state and local authorities. Perhaps because of
the patchwork quality of federal criminal legislation, there is too little
recognition of its comprehensiveness. For all practical purposes, most
crime has been "federalized" for some time, and the recent additions
to the federal criminal code are merely the latest in a long trend.
Whether desirable or not, the federalization of the substantive crimi-
nal law is largely an accomplished fact.
It follows that real debate should shift to the resources and priori-
ties of federal prosecutors. With legislation covering virtually any
crime they might plausibly wish to prosecute, federal prosecutors pick
their targets and marshal their resources, not in response to the limita-
tions of the substantive law but according to their own priorities and
agendas. Informed debate should focus, therefore, squarely on the
federal prosecutive function.
In this Article, we have tried to identify features of federal law
and practice that should-and do-influence the decisions of federal
prosecutors. The ability to use uncorroborated accomplice testimony
in federal court counsels in favor of bringing the types of cases that
typically are based on historical accounts of continuing criminal activ-
ity. The ability to use the powers of the federal grand jury, unbur-
dened by a no-hearsay rule, suggests that the grand jury be integrated
into long-term investigations. The ability to demand testimony in ex-
change for use-and-derivative-use immunity is most important when
immunized witnesses are crucial-even when immunized witnesses
will not tell the truth. And the cooperation incentives created by the
97. See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,
STUDY DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1970) (giving a broad overview of
the Study Draft). Although there are compelling arguments in favor of a complete over-
haul and recodification of federal penal statutes, all such efforts have failed. See NORMAN
ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMNAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 45-47 (2d
ed. 1993) (describing the fate of the 1970 Brown Commission Report).
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Sentencing Guidelines are most useful when deployed to strip away
the code of silence that characterizes organized crime.
These aspects of federal law help explain the enormous successes
that federal prosecutors have achieved in RICO prosecutions of or-
ganized crime. Other features of the federal system-including pre-
trial detention for dangerousness, the Witness Security Program,
federal forfeiture statutes, and differences in evidentiary require-
ments-also contribute. This focus is chiefly descriptive, but it also
has normative implications. Federal prosecutors are peculiarly well
equipped to combat organized crime. In our view, this is precisely
what they should be doing.
